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L The Rule Against Contact with Represented Persons 
The rule against attorney contact with a represented person is 
deeply entrenched in the law of lawyering. 1 Its origins date back to 
the early 1800S,2 and today the rule is enforced through a broad 
1. See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,485 (D.N.M. 1992) (stating that "the ban 
on communicating with a represented party is a fundamental principle of both state and 
federal law , is incorporated into federal law through the local rules, and has its roots in 
our common law tradition. "). 
2. See John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The 
Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 684 n.6 (1979) 
(tracing the origins of the rule to a statement in David Hoffman's treatise, which stated, 
"1 will never enter into any conversation with my opponent's client, relative to his claim 
or defense, except with the consent, and in the presence of his counsel. "). 
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variety of mechanisms, including discipline, 3 disqualification,4 
evidentiary rulings,S and equitable relief. 6 As embodied in Rule 4.2 
3. See, e.g., People v. McCray, 926 P2d 578,579 (Colo. 1996) (censuring 
lawyer publicly); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
Standard 6.3 (1991). Standard 6.3, Improper Communications with Individuals in the 
Legal System, states in relevant part: 
6.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer .. 
(c) improperly communicates with someone in the legal system other 
than a witness, judge, or juror with the intent to influence or affect the 
outcome of the proceeding, and causes significant or potentially significant 
interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding. 
6.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in 
communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows 
that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to 
a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of 
the legal proceeding. 
6.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in 
determining whether it is proper to engage in communication with an 
individual in the legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party 
or interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal 
proceeding. 
6.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an 
isolated instance of negligence in improperly communicating with an 
individual in the legal system, and causes little or no actual or potential injury 
to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with the 
outcome of the legal proceeding. 
4. See, e.g., In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *1 (Tex. 
App. -San Antonio, March 11, 1998) (granting disqualification based on contact by 
plaintiffs' counsel with individual defendant who was later non-suited from action); 
Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1994) (disqualifying attorney for 
interviewing general manager of corporation targeted for suit, and suppressing 
statements) . 
5. See, e.g., Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1123-24 (D. Md. 1996) 
(barring the opposing party, based on improper contact with a respresented person, from 
using the represented person's testimony and disqualifying the firm that committed the 
infraction); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723-24 (W.D. 
Ky. 1991) appeal dism'd, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981) (restoring to class, pending new 
decision on opting out, persons who opted out of class after being improperly contacted). 
See also Leonard E. Gross, Suppression of Evidence as a Remedy for Attorney 
Misconduct: Shall the Sins of the Attorney Be Visited upon the Client?, 54 ALBANY L. 
REV. 437, 446-48 (1990) (arguing that the suppressiur! of evidence that is obtained in 
violation of legal ethics is a legitimate mechanism for enforcing the rules of professional 
conduct). 
6. See, e.g., Impervious Paint Indus., 508 F. Supp. at 724. 
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of the American Bar Association Model Rules Professional 
Conduct, this anti-contact standard provides that:" representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the 
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do SO."7 
A version of the rule exists in every American jurisdiction. 8 
Although the language of state standards often differs from the ABA 
model,9 in important substantive respects, local variations are 
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4,.2 (1997), The legislative 
history of Rule 4.2 is recounted in STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D, SIMON, JR .. 
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STAND d'.DS 264-68 (! 997), 
8. See United States v, Lopez, 765 F. Supp, 1433, 1448-49 (ND, Cal. 1991) 
(stating that "the rule or its equivalent is now in effect in every state "), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th CiL 1993), 
9, See, e,g" CAL. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 2-100 I tt198): 
(A) While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or 
indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member 
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member 
has the consent of the other lawyer .... 
(C) This rule shall not prohibit: 
(1) Communications with a public officer, board, committee, or body; 
(2) Communications initiated by a party seeking advice or 
representation from an independent lawyer of the party's choice; 
or 
(3) Communications otherwise authorized by law. 
FLA. BAR R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4-4,2 (1997): 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate ahout the subject of 
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to he represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior 
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements 
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an 
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted 
to that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the 
adverse party's attorney. 
N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY DR 7-104 (1997): 
A. During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not: 
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the 
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer 
in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer 
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nonnally indistinguishable from Model Rule or nearly identical 
predecessor in the now-superseded Model Professional 
Responsibility. 10 A more detailed. not different. 
version of the rule also appears in the emerging Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers. 11 
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do S,) 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CO!'iDIJCT Rule '+02, Iii TEX. GOV'T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, sub tit. G. app. A (Vernon Supp. llJ97) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, ~ 9) 
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not commU!1lC:uc or cause or 
encourage another to cummunicate about the subject of ,ll~ rerr~sentation 
with a person, organization or entity or government the knows to be 
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unIes" the lJwyer has 
the consem of the other lawyer or is authorized by law tll ,Jc) Sll. 
Some differences between sta : :odes and the ABA model result from the fact that. 
at its annual meeting in 1995, the ABA House of Delegates amendd eJle tex! of Rule 4.2. 
As originally written, the Rule spoke of a "party" (rather than .1 "person") who was 
represented. That choice of phraseology engendered debate about whether the Rule 
applied in the non-litigation context. As a result, "[t]he amendment changed the word 
'party' to 'person' in the text of the Rule and extensively revised the Comment to the 
Rule." G!LLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 262. 
10. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 and DR 7-
104(A) (1980). Ethical Consideration 7-18 stated in pan: 
The legal system in its broadest sense timctiom best when persons in need of 
legal service or assistance are represented by their own Cc)unseL For this 
reason a lawyer should not communicate ll!1 the matter of the 
representation of his client with a person he knows [c) be in the 
matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant to law clf rule of UlUrt 
the consent of the lawyer for that person, 
Disciplinary Rule 7-104 provided in relevant part: 
(A) During the course of his of a client a shall not: 
of the 
representation with a party he knows ttl he in the 
matter unless he has the prior consent or' rhe 
party or is authorized by law to do so. 
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW ClOVER;-.rI~G LAWYERS (Tentative Dra!i 
No, 8, 1997): 
Section 158. Represented Non-Client-General Anti-Contact Rule 
(1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate aJout 
the subject of the representation with a non-cliem whom tJ1e knows to 
be represented in the matter by another lawyer, or with a representative of an 
organizational non-client so represented as defined in § 159, unless: 
(a) the communication is with a public officer or agency to the extent 
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Two facets of the ABA Model Rule on communication with a 
represented person are striking. First, within its scope, the Rule 
states an absolute prohibition, rather than a restriction on time, place, 
or manner. Second, the demands of the Rule cannot be waived by the 
represented person whose interests are at stake. 12 If one were 
addressing the subject tabula rasa, it would be possible to articulate 
a less stringent standard that might adequately serve the purposes of 
the Rule. A standard seeking to protect represented persons from 
overreaching by lawyers who represent adverse interests might do that 
by banning conduct that overreaches, rather than by prohibiting all 
contact entirely. For example, a rule might prohibit communications 
with a represented person about the subjt :t matter the representa-
tion if those communications involve fraud or other forms of 
misrepresentation,13 or amount to undue influence. Alternatively, 
to address concerns about the possibly impruper content of communi-
statedin§ 161; 
(b) the lawyer is a party and represents no other client in the matter; 
(cl the communication is authorized by law; 
(d) the communication reasonably responds to an emergency; or 
(e) the other lawyer consents. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit the lawyer from assisting the client in 
otherwise proper communication by the lawyer's client with a represented 
non-client, unless the lawyer thereby seeks to deceive Of overreach the 
non-client. 
12. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-
396 (1995) (stating that "[wJhile the Committee recognizes that not allowing the 
represented person to waive the Rule's protection may be seen as paternalistic, it believes 
that Rule 4.2 requires that result. "); see also Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1462 (noting that "it 
would be a mistake to speak in terms of a party 'waiving' her' ' ... The rule 
against communicating with represented parties is fundamentally concerned with the 
duties of attorneys, not with the rights of parties. "). 
13. Such an approach frequently is followed by rules applicable to 
communications about the terms and availability of legal services. See, e.g., MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7. I (1997). Rule 7.1 provides in part, "A 
lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services." 
14. A variation of this form of regulation is employed by Rule 7.3 of the MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997) with respect to solicitation of employment 
by targeted mail. The Rule provides in relevant part: "(b) A lawyer shall not solicit 
professional employment from a prospective client by written ... communication ... 
if: . . . (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment. " 
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cations occurring outside the presence of represented person's 
lawyer, a rule might require that all communications with a repre-
sented person be in writing and that copies of such writings be 
retained by their originator or provided to an appropriate party. 15 
Also, a rule intended to protect represented persons could, as many 
rules dO,16 condition the permissibility of the lawyer's conduct on 
consent by the represented person. Another alternative to a total 
prohibition of contact would be to require opposing counsel to notify 
the attorney for the represented person of each communication, either 
before it occurs or after it takes place. However, these and other 
moderate approaches to protecting persons represented by counsel 
have been eschewed. It makes no difference whether the opposing 
lawyer treated the represented party unfairlyl7 or even whether the 
represented person, rather than the adverse lawyer, initiated the 
exchange. 18 Any communiC1~ion about the subject matter of the 
representation is wholly banned, except as allowed by law or by 
consent of the represented person's counsel. Thus, as presently 
formulated in American jurisprudence, the rule against contact with 
represented persons is both sweeping and inflexible. 
15. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(b) C A copy or 
recording of an advertisement or wrinen communication shall be kept for two years after 
its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used. ")'; TEX. 
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 7.07 ("[A] lawyer shall tile with the Lawyer 
Advertisement and Solicitation Review Committee of the State Bar of Texas, either 
before o[ currently with the mailing o[ sending of a written solicitation communication 
... a copy of the written solicitation communication. "). 
16. For example, several cont1ict of interest rules condition the permissibility of 
lawyer conduct on consent by the affected layperson. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CO"<DUCT Rules 1.7(a)(2) and (b)(2), 1.8(a)(3), 1.9(a) and (b), and 
1.12(a). 
17. Cf. In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *6 (Tex. App.-San 
Antonio, March II, 1998) (finding represented person rule violation even though person 
with whom plaintiffs' counsel communicated WJS shortly thereafter non-suited from 
action); In re McCaffrey, 549 P2d 666, 668 (Or. 1976) (reprimanding lawyer who 
unknowingly communicated improperly with a party represented by a lawyer and finding 
it "immaterial whether the direct communication is an intentional or a negligent violation 
of the rule. "). 
18. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-
396 (1995) (stating that "[tJhe fact that the represented person is the one who initiates a 
communication does not render inapplicable the prohibition on communicating about the 
subject matter of the representation. "). 
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A sense of the exacting demands of the "represented person" rule 
can be gained by contrasting this standard with the that govern 
what many persons view as the most odious ethical violation by 
lawyers-"ambulance chasing. "19 With limited exceptions,2° written 
solicitation of an accident victim is ethically permissible if the 
statements made are truthful and not misleading. 21 Oral communica-
tion with an accident victim is also allowed if the injured person 
initiates the conversation. 22 In contrast, under the rule against 
communicating with represented persons, neither written communica-
tions nor communications initialed by a represented person are 
ethically permissible. 
II. Contact with Class Members 
As a codified standard, the application of the represented person 
rule is definitionally driven. Among the key questions are: who is a 
"person" within the meaning of the rule; when does "representation" 
begin and end; what "matters" are within the scope of a representa-
19. See Gerald S. Reamey, The Crime of Barratry: Criminal Responsibility for 
a Breach of Professional Responsibility, 53 TEX. B.1. 1011, 1011 (1990) (noting that 
"[sJuch misconduct is not ... merely a breach of professional etiquette or a violation of 
disciplinary rules. It is also a crime. "). 
20. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,633 (1995) (finding that 
on appropriate facts, a state may impose a thirty day waiting period on written 
communications by lawyers with accident victims). 
21. See Shapero v. Kenrucky Bar Ass'n, 486 US. 466, 479 (1988) (finding that 
non-misleading targeted mail is constirutionally protected'. 
22. See Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation Law Firm Clients by Depaning 
Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and DiscljJ/lnary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 1, 95 (1988) (commenting that "an attorney may not be disciplined for responding 
to communications initiated by a prospective client. "); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRA1\;f, 
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 14.2.5, at 788 n.6 (1986) (stating that "the Code does not 
prohibit solicitation of a client so long as the person solicited has initiated the contact 
with the lawyer. "); Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 399 N.E.2d 969,972 (Ill. 1979) 
(tinding that "the cases generally condemn as unlawful solicitation the drumming up or 
procurement of legal business ... Ifroml potential clients who have not initiated contact 
with the attorney. "), Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 cmt. 7 
(1997) (noting that labeling requirements ordinarily applicable to written communications 
about legal services do not apply to communications sent in response to requests of 
potential clients). 
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tion; and when does a lawyer "know" that a person is represented by 
another lawyer in a matter?23 Although there is considerable authority 
bearing upon these and related issues, 24 there are still important 
unresolved questions relating to the interpretation of the rule,25 
including its proper operation in class action litigation. 
In the context of class actions, it is now generally agreed that the 
lawyer for a certified class represents all putative members of the 
class,26 at least until they elect to opt out of the class.n This is true 
even though putative members of the class may never have communi-
cated with the class attorney or may not even know that the class 
action exists. The court's certification of the class, at least for 
purposes of this rule, is deemed to create a lawyer-client relationship 
23. See generally ABNBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 71 :301 
et seq. (1997) (detailing obligations to third parties and communications involving 
persons represented by counsel). 
24. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-
396 (1995) (providing an extensive discussion of "Communications with Represented 
Persons"); see also Barbara Hanson Nellermoe & Fidel Rodriguez, Professional 
Responsibility and the Litigator: A Comprehensive Guide to Texas Disciplinary Rules 
3.0} Through 4.04, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 443, 491-95 (1997) (discussing Texas 
precedent). 
25. One such question having great importance is whether. in the context of 
litigation, a discharged attorney ceases to "represent" a client before a formal change in 
counsel of record. In In re News American Publishing, }nc., 1998 WL 105451 (Tex. 
App. -San Antonio, March II, 1998), the court, following the lead of an earlier ABA 
ethics opinion, held that representation does not cease merely because the client states 
that the lawyer has been terminated and that '" if retained counsel has entered an 
appearance in a matter. and remains counsel of record, ... the communicating 
lawyer may not communicate with the person until the lawyer has withdrawn her 
appearance.'" In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *6 (quoting ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995». 
26. See, e.g., HatTer v. Temple Univ., 115 F.R.D. 506, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) 
(citing DR 7-104(A) and finding that defense counsel's conduct was a "t1agrant and 
inexcusable violation of professional standards"); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 
1474, 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that "once the court certified the class ... a 
limited attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiffs' attorney and absent class 
members"); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (stating 
that "the disciplinary rule clearly applies in suits which proceed as a class action"). 
27. See Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 722-23 
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that contact during opt-out period violated the rule against 
communication with represented persons). 
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between class counsel and putative class members. 28 This view is 
consistent with language in the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, which provides that the relationship of client and lawyer is 
established not only when a person manifests to a lawyer the person's 
intent for the lawyer to provide legal services, but also when "a 
tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the 
services. "29 The members of a certified class are "represented" by 
reason of the court's certification of the class and designation of class 
counsel; because they are represented, they come within the scope of 
the rule and normally may not be contacted by opposing counsel. 30 
Thus, in the context of mass tort litigation, defense counsel may not 
communicate with potential members of the plaintiff class except with 
the consent of counsel for the class or as authorized by law, including 
authorization by an order of the court. 31 lVl( .:over, because a lawyer 
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt. I 
(Tentative Draft No.8, 1997) (commenting that "according to the majority of decisions, 
once the proceeding has been certitied as a class action, the members of the class are 
considered clients of the lawyer for the class. "). 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f 
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996). Comment fto Section 26 elaborates; 
Class actions may pose difficult questions of client identification. For 
many purposes, the named class representatives are the clients of the lawyer 
for the class .... [CJlass members who are not named representatives also 
have some characteristics of clients. For example, their confidential 
communications directly to the class lawyer may he privileged ... and 
opposing counsel may not be free to communicate with them directly ... . 
Members of the class often lack the incentive or knowledge to monitor the 
performance of the class representatives. Although members may sometimes 
opt out of the class, they may have no practical alternative other than 
remaining in the class if they wish to enforce their rights. Lawyers in class 
actions thus have duties to the class as well as to the class representatives. 
30. See Fulco v. Continental Cablevision, Inc" 789 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Mass, 
1992) (stating that after certitication, "defendants' counsel must treat the unnamed class 
members as 'represented by' the class counsel for purposes of DR 7-104"), 
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt. g 
(Tentative Draft No, 8, 1997); 
A tribunal, in the exercise of its authority over advocates appearing before it 
, .. and over proceedings generally, may expand the right of a lawyer to 
make ex parte contact with a non-client represented by opposing counsel. 
Such a court order is usually entered after notice and hearing. For example, 
although a lawyer for plaintiffs in a certitied class action is considered to 
represent all members of the class, ... the court may permit defense counsel 
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may not "violate ... the rules of professional conduct ... through 
the acts of another,"32 a lawyer may not induce or assist a client or 
others to engage in types of communication with putative class 
members that the lawyer may not undertake directly Y 
Application of the represented person rule to the pre-certification 
period in class action litigation requires a different analysis. Absent 
a judicial determination that a class should be certified, there is no 
basis for concluding that an unnamed potential member of a class, 
who has never been in contact with the lawyer seeking to certify the 
class, should be treated as having a lawyer. 3J The unnamed putative 
class member has not sought legal services, nor has a court ordered 
that they should be rendered to that person. Accordingly, a number 
of courts hold that the represented person rule does not prohibit 
communications between defense counsel and potential members of 
to approach class members directly if in the circumstances the court 
concludes that such persons will not be subjected to overreaching and that 
direct contact would otherwise be appropriate. 
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a) (1997). 
33, See Impervious Paint Indus" Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F, Supp. 720, 722-23 
(W,D. Ky. 1991) (finding that even though it was "undisputed that [defense] counsel did 
not personally contact any class member," the evidence showed that the defendant's 
representatives contacted class members "after consulting with counsel" and that 
"counsel had full knowledge of their client's intention to attempt to sabotage the class 
notice, and, in derogation of their duty as officers of the Court, they did not advise 
against the course of action"). 
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §158 cmt. 
I (Tentative Draft No.8, 1997) ("prior to certification, only those class members with 
whom the lawyer maintains a personal client-lawyer relationship are clients"); MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.24, at 233 (3d eJ. 1995) (noting that "no formal 
attorney-client relationship exists between class counsel and the putative members of the 
class prior to certification. "). 
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an uncertified class. 35 Despite these rulings, the issue has not been 
fully settled. 
First, statements in what many regard as the leading treatise on 
legal ethics can be fairly read to suggest that the issue is unresolved 
and that the represented person rule applies to the pre-certification 
context-at least in the case of certain forms of communication, such 
as offers to settle on stated terms or attempts to elicit statements 
concerning the matter in controversy that might be disadvantageous 
to the makers of the statements. 36 In addition, the Reporter's Note to 
35. See Babbitt v. Albertson's, Inc., 1993 WL 150300, at *1 (N.D. Cal., March 
21, 1993) (finding that defense attorney's pre-certification communication with putative 
class members did not violate anti-contact rule); Gibbons v. CIT Group/Sales Fin .. Inc., 
400 S.E.2d 104, 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming order requiring attorneys on both 
sides to notify each other in writing within twent " four hours of name and address of 
putative class member contacted, but otherwise permitting communication); Atari, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867,871 (CL Cal. App. 1985) ("We cannot accept 
the suggestion that a potential (but as yet unapproached) class member should be deemed 
'a party . . . represented by counsel' even before the class is certified. "). See also 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 158 cmt. I (Tentative Draft 
No.8, 1997) (commenting that "[pJrior to certification and unless the court orders 
otherwise, in the case of competing putative class actions a lawyer for one set of 
representatives may contact class members who are only putatively represented by a 
competing lawyer, but not class representatives or members known to be directly 
represented in the matter by the other lawyer. "). 
36. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 4.2: 
102, at 734-36 (2d ed. 1997 & 1998 Supp.): 
Members of a class other than the designated class representatives have 
an indeterminate status as participants in the litigation, at least until they 
affirmatively "opt out" of the class, where that option is available under 
governing rules of civil procedure. For certain purposes . .. unnamed class 
members should be regarded as clients of (he lawyer represeming [he class 
from the inception of the suit, even before its certification the coun as a 
proper class action. For example, most authorities rightly assume that the 
lawyer acts in a fiduciary capacity toward these people, and thus owes them 
duties of loyalty and care, even though he is still seeking formal authority to 
proceed on their behalf .... 
In light of this indeterminacy of the status of class members, it is not 
obvious whether they should be regarded as "represented" persons for 
purposes of Rule 4.2. Where there is already an ongoing relationship 
between class members and the party opposing the class, such as between a 
group of employees and their employer, direct independent communication 
between the parties is inevitable, and additional communications through 
counsel ought not to be prohibited as long as courtesy copies of 
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the Restatement of the Law Governing Laln'ers indicates that there is 
support for a minority view that the anti-contact provision relating to 
represented persons applies to pre-certification communicationsY 
Finally, it is the personal knowledge of the author of this Article that 
attorneys engaged in litigation still contest this issue and, with the 
hope of securing favorable court rulings, obtain affidavits from 
experts bearing upon the question. 38 
Whatever uncertainty there is regarding the inapplicability of the 
represented person rule to the pre-certification context of class 
litigation can be dispelled through an exploration of the policies 
underlying the rule. 
III. The Policy Basis of the Represented Person 
Various rationales have been invokd to the sweeping 
prohibitions of the rule against attorney communication with repre-
sented persons. In terms of their number and breadth and the 
communications are provided to counseL On the other hand, the lawyer for 
the opponent of the class should not be allowed to take statements concerning 
the matter in controversy from individual class members through ex parte 
interviews, for that could impose the very disadvantages that the rule is 
designed to prevent. 
Intermediate situations should be resolved 
purpose of the Rule 4.2, which is primarily to protect 
only incidentally to protect opposing lawyers. 
(Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
reasoning from the 
clients and 
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNIl'<G LAWYERS, § 158 cmt. 
I (Tentative Draft No.8, 1997). Citing Impervious Paint Indusrries, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 
at 720, the Reporter's Note on comment I states, contact-during Opl-
out period-violates anti-contact rule." The description of the Impervious Paim ruling 
may be incorrect, for it is not clear whether the contact by defense counsel with putative 
class members occurred before or after certitication. However, it is reasonable to 
interpret the case as stating, at least in dicta, that putative class members are represented 
even before certification for purposes of the anti-contact rule. 
38. I gave such an affidavit on October 28, 1997, in City of Mercedes v. Reata 
Indus. Gas, L.P., et ai. (No. C-2262-97-A, 92nd District Coun, Hidalgo County, 
Texas), in which I opined that certain pre-certification contacts were not pruhibited by 
Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. I understand that 
the issue to which that affidavit related is no longer part of the case because a temporary 
restraining order, prohibiting contact between defense counsel and putative class 
members, has been lifted. 
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certainty with which they are asserted, these reasons appear so 
formidable that a foreign visitor initially encountering the rule might 
easily conclude that it is no less than a fundamental precept of 
American law, without which the entire legal system might collapse. 39 
While full precision in classifying these rationales is not possible, the 
arguments generally fall into four categories which suggest that the 
purposes of the rule are: (1) to protect a represented person from 
overreaching by opposing counsel;40 (2) to promote the proper 
functioning of the legal system;41 (3) to protect the attorney-client 
39. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 268540, at *6 (Tex. App.-San 
Antonio, March 11, 1998) ("The anticontact rule is ... imposed to protect ... the very 
integrity of the adversary system."); In rr> Doe, 801 F. ' J')p. 478, 485 CD.N.M. 1992) 
("[T]he han on communicating with a [.:presemed party IS a fundamental principle of 
hoth state and federal law ... and has its roots in our <.:ommon law tradition. "). 
40. See, e.g., ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 392 (3d ed. 1996) (commenting that "[tJhe 
purpose of Rule 4.2 is to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of uncounselled 
laypersons.") (citations omitted); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 730 (noting 
that "Rule 4.2 prevents a lawyer from taking advantage of a lay person to secure 
admissions against interest or to achieve an unconscionable settlement of a dispute. "); 
id. at 731-32 (commenting that" [tJhe purpose of the rule is ... to prevent clients from 
being overreached by opposing lawyers. "); Report of the ABA Standing Comm. on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, reprinted in GlLLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 
266 (noting the "need to protect uncounselled persons against being taken advantage of 
hy opposing counsel" and "need to protect uncounselled persons against the wiles of 
opposing counsel"); Leuhsdorf, supra note 2, at 686 (stating: ., Authorities ... usually 
hase the rule on the danger that lawyers will bamboozle parties unprotected by their own 
counsel."); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal. Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (noting that the rule prevents lawyers from using superior skills and training to 
ohtain "unwise settlements"). 
41. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPO~SlBILlTY EC 7-18 (1980): 
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of 
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this 
reason a lawyer should not communicate on the suhject matter of the 
representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented. 
See also Polyeast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625 (noting that the rule protects 
privileged information and facilitates settlements by allowing lawyers skilled in 
negotiat'i1g to conduct discussions); United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that there is a societal interest in laypersons not making 
decisions with major legal implications without the advice of counsel); Leubsdorf, supra 
note 2, at 686 (noting that "[a] less dramatic possibility [of harm] is that conversations 
hetween a nonlawyer and an adverse lawyer will lead to disputes about what was said, 
which may force the lawyer to become a witness. "). 
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relationship;42 and (4) to protect the interests of the attorney for the 
represented person. 43 
None of these arguments is sufficient to extend the anti-contact 
rule to unnamed putative class members during the pre-certification 
period. 
A. Prevention of Overreaching 
The prevention of overreaching of laypersons by attorneys 
representing adverse parties is the justification most frequently urged 
in defense of the no-contact rule. This rationale has an aura of 
altruistic consumer protection, and also a ring of truth. The repre-
sented person rule does indeed prevent overreaching of laypersons, 
for it bans all forms of contact entirely, whether they involve 
overreaching or not. Of COUl S=, whether such a drastic prohibition 
is necessary to prevent overreaching is open to challenge. As 
suggested above,44 there are many more moderate alternative forms 
of regulation that might prove to be adequate substitutes. 
42. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 40, 
at 392 (stating that "[t]he purpose of Rule 4.2 is ... to preserve the integrity of the 
lawyer-client relationship. "); Report of the ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 7, at 266 (noting 
"importance of preserving the client-anorney relationship "); ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (stating that anti-contact rule 
"safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel"). See 
also TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4.02 cmt.l (stating that the "Rule 
is directed at efforts to circumvent the lawyer-client relationship existing between other 
persons, organizations or entities of government and their respective counsel"); 
WOLFRAM, supra note 22, ~ 11.6.2, at 612 (noting that both DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule 
4.2 "strongly imply that their prohibitions are limited to attempts by the offending 
lawyer, in represeming his or her own client, to drive between other lawyers and 
clients. "). 
43. See, e.g., 2 HAZ,\RD & HODES, supra note 36, at 731-32 (stating that '. [tJhe 
purpose of the rule is to protect lawyers' agency relationships with their respective 
clients"); id. at 736 (noting that "the purpose of the Rule ... [is] only incidentally to 
protect opposing lawyers. "). See also Lewis Kurlamzick, The Prohibition on 
Communication with an Adverse Pany, 51 CONN. BJ. 136, 138-52 (1977) (offering as 
a possible justification for the rule the argument that it rescues lawyers from a painful 
conflict between their duty to advance their client's interests and their duty not to 
overreach an unprotected opposing party). 
44. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
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In the class action context, a decision not to extend the repre-
sented person rule to the pre-certification period would not mean that 
opposing counsel would be unregulated and free to overreach. 
Communication with a person who does not have counsel must be 
consistent with standards applicable to communications with unrepre-
sented persons. As embodied in Model Rule 4.3,45 those standards 
prohibit a lawyer from stating or implying "that the lawyer is 
disinterested"46 or from giving "advice to an unrepresented person 
other than the advice to obtain counsel. ·'·n A lawyer's communica-
tions with an unrepresented person also must not run afoul of the 
general rule that provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. "48 A lawyer 
who makes a fraudulent statemert to a non-client not only is subject 
to discipline, but also may be sued for damages. 49 addition, a court 
may enter an order limiting communications between a defendant and 
potential class members based upon a specific showing of actual 
threatened abuse. 50 A court may also create procedures for monitor 
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1997). 
46. !d. 
47. !d. cmt. 1 (1997). 
48. Ed. Rule 8.4(c). 
49. See. e.g., Likover v. Sunt10wer Terrace ll, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468,472 
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, n.w.h.) (HAn attorney has no general duty to the 
opposing party, but he is liable tor injuries to third parties when his conduct is fraudulent 
or malicious. He is not liable for breach of a duty to [he third party, but he is liable for 
fraud.") (citing Wilbourn v. Mostek Corp., 537 F. Supp. 302 Colo. 1982)). 
50. See Atari, Inc. v Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 871 (Ct. App. 
1985). The Atan court denied such relief in a state actin involving potential members 
of an uncertitied class, based on the guidance provided by the United States Supreme 
Court in Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), a certified class action arising under 
federal law: 
In Gulf Oil a federal district court had imposed "a complete ban on all 
communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel 
and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without 
the prior approval of the court" ... and the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine the scope of the court's authority to limit 
communications from named plaintiffs to prospective class members. The 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the federal district court had 
exceeded the scope of its authority, quoting from Coles v. Marsh (3d Cir. 
1977) 560 F.2d 186, 189: H[T]o the extent that the district court is 
empowered . . . to restrict certain communications in order to prevent 
frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without 
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ing whether abuse occurs, such as a requirement that copies of aU 
written communications be filed with the court and provided to 
opposing counsel. 51 The availability of this diverse array of safe-
guards for preventing overreaching of unnamed putative class 
members, by itself, is good reason for not extending the absolute and 
inflexible terms of the represented person rule to the pre-certification 
period of class action litigation. 
From a different perspective, in terms of the need for protection 
from overreaching, there is no basis for distinguishing putative 
members of an uncertified class from other unrepresented persons 
who might bring suit. In the tort context, if a person is injured in an 
accident, that person, before engaging counsel, may be contacted by 
an attorney for the defendant with an offer to settle potential claims. 52 
This is true, even though there may be a risk of overreaching because 
the amount of the offer is inadequate, there is pressure to make a 
quick decision, or for some other reason. 53 Although certain 
members of the bar have decried such settlement practices,54 they tend 
a specific record showing by the moving parry of the particular abuses by 
which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the 
showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought 
would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration 
to the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties." 
166 Cal. App. 3d at 871 (citing GuifOil, 452 U.S. at 102); see also Hampton Hardware, 
Inc. v. Cotter & Co., Inc., 156 F.R.D. 630, 635 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that a 
lawyer who had on three occasions contacted potential class members, warning them not 
to join a class action, was prohibited from further contact with potential class members 
regarding the action until the date of trial or the date of an order denying certification). 
51. See In Re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 896 F. Supp. 916, 919 n.5 (D. Minn. 
1995) (declining to "assess the compliance" of counsel with Model Rule 4.2 and noting 
that if a breach of the rule occurred it was de minimis). 
52. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 747 (stating that "lawyers for 
insurance companies have been permitted to negotiate settlements with unrepresented tort 
victims and workers' compensation claimants" ). 
53. Cf id. at 748-749 (discussing the "potential for overreaching" that is present 
when a lawyer seeks to obtain a release from an unrepresented person and criticizing 
Model Rule 4.3 for not adequately dealing with that subject). 
54. See Richard Connelly, Billboard War Heats Up Amid Big Suits, Barratry 
Allegations, TEx. LAW., Aug. 18, 1997, at 19 (quoting David Bright, a Texas attorney, 
as stating, with regard to the legal issues arising from refinery explosions, "I don't see 
[barratry in Corpus Christi] as being as big a problem as the refineries signing releases 
.... I'm sure there are people out there ambulance chasin [sic]-but signing releases 
is a greater evil. "). 
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to be lone voices. Thus, while personal contact with unrepresented 
persons in the form of client solicitation continues to be vigorously 
condemned,55 there is no significant movement in legal profession 
to ban contacts between defense attorneys, or persons acting on !heir 
behalf, and unrepresented accident victims. The lack of any such call 
for reform may simply renect the power of the defense bar and the 
clients it represents. Or it may renect a general consensus that the 
usual rules (which, as mentioned above, prohibit giving advice to an 
unrepresented person and making false statements) are adequate for 
dealing with the risk of overreaching that accompanies such contacts. 
If the latter is true, those same safeguards should also adequately 
protect unnamed putative members of an uncertified class action 
arising from an accident. 
A variation of the view that the anti-contact rule prevents 
overreaching is the argument that the rule s,. \ cs a represented person 
from being deprived of the protection that he or she attempted to 
secure by electing to engage counsel,56 whether by reducing the 
likelihood of inadvertent harmful disclosures or otherwise. 57 The idea 
55. See Susan Borreson, State Bar Lashes Out at o 'Quinn, TEX. LAW., Jan. 5, 
1998, at 1, 18-19 (reporting barratry prosecution based on case-running allegations). 
56. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 64-65 (arguing that the rule is "designed to 
prevent an opposing lawyer from gaining an adversarial advantage for [his or her] client 
by circumventing, through direct dealings with a layperson, the protections which that 
individual has sought to obtain by choosing to retain counsel H). See also In re Complaint 
of Korea Shipping Corp., 621 F. Supp. 164, 167 (D. Alaska 1985): 
The thrust of DR 7-104 "is to prevent situations in which a represented party 
may be taken advantage of by adverse counseL" ... A related purpose of the 
rule is to "preserve the proper functioning of the legal profession" by 
ensuring that in making decisions relating to a dispute a client has the benefit 
of the advice of the legal expert he has employed to assist him. 
(citations omined); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 
95-396 (1995) (commenting that "[t]here is nothing more central to what it means to be 
a client in the American system of justice than to know that, having hired a lawyer, the 
client need not worry about being taken advantage of by lawyers, with special skills and 
training, who represent others. H). 
57. See In re News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *5 (Tex. App.-San 
Antonio, March 11, 1998) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995), which stated that '''the Rule operates to 
reduce the likelihood of the represented person engaging in communications that might 
ultimately prove harmful to her cause by imposing a strict ethical obligation on the 
communicating lawyer. ' H). 
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here is that a person should not be stripped of the fruits of his or her 
own diligent efforts, namely the advantages that are secured by 
obtaining counsel. Put differently: to encourage diligence, diligence 
should be rewarded. 58 Whatever force these arguments may have in 
the usual case, they have no application to unnamed putative class 
members. Such persons have not sought to engage an attorney. 
Permitting opposing counsel to communicate directly would therefore 
not take away any benefits that the unnamed putative class members 
had previously sought to obtain. The diligence rationale does not 
apply because there is no "diligence" to be rewarded. 
B. Promotion of the Proper Functioning of [he Legal System 
It is sometimes asserted thet the represented person rule promotes 
the proper functioning of the legal system. 59 Taken at a broad level 
of generality, the correctness of this statement is not obvious. To 
begin with, the rule exacts a high toll in transaction costs: "Requiring 
both lawyers to be present whenever one is present imposes inconve-
nience and expense."60 In addition, there are many facets to the legal 
system aside from adversarial litigation, and it may not be useful to 
structure the ethics rules applicable to non-litigation fields, such as 
58. This rationale is similar to one that runs throughout tort law, namely that "tort 
law should encourage individuals to employ avaibble resourCeS to protect their own 
interests." VINCE:-lT R. JOHNSON & ALA:-l GC~N, STUDIES l~ AMERICAN TORT LAW 
6 (1994). 
59. See Carter v. Kamaras, 430 A.2d 1058, 1059 1981) (arguing that the 
rule preserves the proper functioning of the legal system); In re News Am. Publ 'g, Inc., 
1998 WL 105451, at *6 ("The anti-contact rule is more than common courtesy; it is a 
professional requirement imposed to protect the client, other parties, and indeed, the very 
integrity of the adversary system."); see also supra note 41. 
60. Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 687; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERJ'HNG LAWYERS * 158 cmt. b (Tentat;v~ Draft No.8, 1997) (noting that the 
rule has been criticized for requiring three-stage communications that are often more 
expensive, delayed, and inconvenient than direct communication). 
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transactional law practice, on an adversarial modeL 61 Moreover, the 
idea that one lawyer must be present to neutralize presence of 
another lawyer is not necessarily sound. Sophisticated business 
clients, for example, may be better able than their lawyers to conduct 
negotiations, and are perfectly capable of deciding whether they 
should communicate with opposing counsel directly. It is not clear 
that, outside of litigation, the inflexible formalities of the represented 
person rule optimize the proper functioning of the legal process. 
With respect to the litigation arena, it has been argued that the 
anti-contact rule protects privileged information and facilitates 
settlements. 62 The first of these justifications has no application to 
unnamed putative class members, who, since they are unrepresented, 
have not engaged in communications with counsel that might be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Doubts can also be raised 
about the merits of the settlemer:- facilitation rationale. It is easy to 
think of situations where the involvement of an attorney has been an 
obstacle, rather than an aid, to the settlement of a dispute. 63 Admit-
tedly, many lawyers can marshal the facts and the law in a way that 
compellingly presents a client's case, and such efforts tend to make 
settlement more likely. However, this line of reasoning is more 
justification for why laypersons should have lawyers than for why 
there should be a rule banning an opposing attorney from communi-
cating with a represented person. To that extent, it is difficult to 
differentiate the unnamed putative class member in a mass tort case 
from the unrepresented victim of a non-mass tort. Both victims, 
under this view, would be better off with attorneys. There is no good 
61. Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 689: 
In many instances-for example, when two small business firms are working 
out the details of a joint venture-there is not the slightest reason why every 
inquiry coming to or from one lawyer must travel hy way of another. In such 
situations, it might he perfectly sensible for one party to do without a lawyer 
altogether .... Some clients may even be better suited than some lawyers 
to conduct some meetings. 
62. See, e.g., Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
63. Cj. WOLFRAM, supra note 22, § 11.6, at 613-14 ("A strict anticontact rule 
pinches with particular pain when an unreasonable, and possibly disloyal, opposing 
lawyer refuses to transmit settlement offers to his or her client. But the ABA ethics 
committee has refused to recognize an exception here. ") (citations omitted). 
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reason for saying that the mass tort victim who 
member should be protected by the anti-contact 
of the non-mass tort will not. 
517 
is a putative class 
while the victim 
An interesting variation on systemic justifications for the anti-
contact rule is a recent Texas case which appears to take the position 
that a purpose of the rule, as applied to represented defen-
dants, is to prevent one codefendant from being induced to switch 
sides to the disadvantage of the others. 64 An abhorrence for unprinci-
pled side-switching has been a driving force behind many rulings in 
the tort field,65 such as prohibitions against Mary Carter agreements()() 
64. See In re News Am. Pub I 'g, Inc., [998 WL 105451, at *6 (granting 
d.isqualitication based on contact by plaintitfs' counsel with ll1divldual defendant who was 
later non-suited from action\. The opinic \ ,.)1' the C(JUrI stateJ in part: 
Clearly Frazier has changed siJes in this ca"e anJ. as a result, may avoid 
personal exposure in the suit. That will undoubtedlv cause prejudice to the 
remaining defend.ants who shared the same attorney Although the 
improper communication of privileged information is Jifficult to prove 
without direct testimony from the client, it can reasonably be implied by 
virtue of the fact that plaintiffs have designated him as a testifying expert on 
their behalf, ... 
The anti-contact rule is .. , imposed to protect the client, OIher parties, and 
indeed, the very integrity of the adversary system. 
(emphasis added.) 
65. See Timothy D. Howell, So Long "Sweelill.'lln "-State farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the ([.I' [he Latest in a Line 
Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. ·n, 66·70 (\ (discussing Texas 
cases in which shifting positions of parties distorted 
66. The Texas Supreme Court defined a :Vlary Can~r agreement as follows: 
A Mary Carter agreement exists . . . when tile enters into a 
settlement agreement with one defendant anJ )P'~S ill trial against the 
remaining defendant(s). The settling defenuant. wlio remains a party. 
guarantees the plailllitf a minimum payment, whi~h mav I'e uffset in whole 
or in part by an exce,s judgment recovered at trial This creates a 
tremendous incentive tll[ the settling defenua!1l h\ elbure that the plaintiff 
succeeds in obtaining a sizeable recovery, anu thus !l1Ull\ates the defendant 
to assist greatly in the plaintiff's presentation of [he case. 
Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240,247 (Tex. 1992). Because of the tendency of such 
arrangements to distort the adversarial process, many courts allow evidt.llCe of a Mary 
Carter agreement to be introduced at trial, for the purpose of minimizing the chanCes that 
the jury will be misled. See id. at 248-49 (discussing cases and commentary that have 
"remove[d] the secrecy within which Mary Carter agreements have traditionally been 
shrouded. "). Some courts have imposed greater limitations. See id. at 250 (declaring 
Mary Caner agreements void as against public policy, based in part on the tendency of 
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or the assignment of certain claimsY However, whether the risk that 
communications by opposing counsel may lead a represented person 
to "switch sides" is sufficiently great as to justify a total prophylactic 
ban on such communications is debatable. Other alternative safe-
guards are available, such as a bar against the use of testimony by the 
person who switched sides68 or disqualification of counsel in cases 
where a communication with a represented person is followed by a 
change of sides. 69 In any event, the side-switching rationale has no 
application to the pre-certification context of class action litigation. 
During that time period, unnamed putative class members are not on 
anyone's side. They have neither opted into nor out of the class. An 
extension of the anti-contact rule to pre-certification communications 
cannot be justified by the risk-of-side-switching rationale. 
C. Protection of the Lawyer-Client Relationship 
A number of authorities take the position that the represented 
person rule is designed to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client 
relationship.70 Just what is meant by this argument is not clear. 
Perhaps the best elaboration of this view is the suggestion by one 
scholar that the prohibitions of the rule are "limited to attempts by the 
offending lawyer, in representing his or her client, to drive wedges 
between other lawyers and clients. "71 So construed, the rule serves 
the laudable goal of preserving whatever exists by way of a healthy, 
productive relationship between attorney and client. However, if 
understood in those terms, the rule has no application to unnamed 
putative class members. Those persons are not engaged any 
such agreements to cause unprincipled side-switching). 
67. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon. 878 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. 
App.-San Antonio 1994, writ refd) (holding assignment of cause uf action for legal 
malpractice invalid). 
68. Cj. Elboor, 845 S.W.2d at 252 (declaring Mary Carter agreements void as 
against public policy and ruling that a settling defendant may not participate in a trial in 
whicL he or she retains a tinancial interest in the plaintiff's lawsuit). 
69. See In re News Am. Publ 'g, Inc., 1998 WL 105451, at *5-*6 (granting 
disqualification based on contact by plaintiffs' counsel with individual defendant who 
switched sides). 
70. See supra note 42. 
71. WOLFRA.M., supra note 22, § 11.6.2, at 612. 
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professional relationship with the attorney the class, productive or 
not. Consequently, there is no relationship to be preserved from the 
divisive "wedges" of opposing counsel. This line of reasoning cannot 
justify an extension of the anti-contact provision to the pre-certifica-
tion period. 
Another possibility is that those who argue that the rule preserves 
the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship mean that it preserves 
the power and authority of the lawyer \is-a-vis the client. This 
construction is suggested by those terms of the rule that place the 
right to consent to communication solely within the hands of the 
lawyer and entirely beyond the reach the client. Any such 
argument in favor of allocating all authority to the professional party 
to the relationship is markedly out of step the times. A growing 
body of court decisions and other authority recognizes, in myriad 
contexts, the right of a client to be informed ()f all material matters72 
and to exercise control over important decisions. 73 Viewed against 
the trend toward client empowerment, the represented person rule 
stands out as a stark aberration. It is a better candidate for abrogation 
than for unnecessary extension to the pre-certification context of class 
action litigation. 
72. See, e.g., Garris v. Severson, 252 Cal Rptr. 204,209 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(depublished opinion) (denying summary judgment mution filed by firm and attorney in 
case where both were being sued for failure to disclose tully and fairly to client facts on 
liability); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S. W.2d 261. 2h,) (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 
1991, writ denied) (commenting that "the relationshlp hctween attorney and client has 
been described as one of uberrinw fides, which me,lllS. 'most abundant good faith,' 
requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and llOllesty, and the absence of any 
concealment or deception. ") (citations omitted). See Robert F. Cochran, [eRa/ 
Representation and the Next Sreps TO\vord Chou CiJli!rol. Attorney Malpractice Jor rhe 
Failure to Allow the Client (() Control Net;otimion oml 1':lr.\lIe Alternatives to Litigation, 
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990) (discussing the eXlent of client control over kgal 
representation) . 
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CU;"DUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1997) ("/\ 
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to 
be pursued. "); id. at Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation. "); id. at Rule 1.14(a) ("When a cliem's ability to make adequately 
considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because 
of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as 
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client. "). 
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A more palatable rationale is the argument that the anti-contact 
rule is designed "to ensure that the adverse party's attorney can 
function properly. "74 This may mean nothing more than that the rule 
places the attorney in a position to learn relevant facts and to control 
the tlow of information about a client's case. Interpreted in that vein, 
the rule may go further than is necessary to advance those goals, but 
is otherwise unobjectionable. However, this rationale offers no 
justification for extending the anti-contact rule to communications 
involving unnamed putative class members before certification. 
attorney for the class has no right to ( (,ntro! the of information 
from such persons and no duty to gather facts about their claims. 
Cessante rationae legis, cessat et ipsa lex. 75 
D. Protection of the Attorney '5 Interests 
One occasionally encounters arguments which tend to suggest that 
a purpose of the anti-contact rule is to protect interests of the 
attorney, rather than the interests of the client, the system, or the 
relationship. The personal interests of the attorney might be 
reputational, such as where an attorney fears that he or she may be 
embarrassed because uncounselled statements made by a client may 
compromise the lawyer's tactics. 76 Or the interests might be 
economic, where an uncounselled client, as the result of communica-
tions with opposing counseL may discharge the or settle for 
an inadequate amount, either of which may the attorney's 
ability to earn a fee. 
Any defense of the anti-contact rule based 
interests of the attorney is typically made 
proponents of such views are apologetic or 
on personal 
timidity. 
to suggest 
74. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,485 CD.N.M. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1447-49 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
75. "The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 238 (6th ed. 1990). 
76. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, at 731 (citing John Leubsdorf. 
Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lal'vyer's Veto and the Client's 
Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683 (1979». 
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that such interests are entitled to only secondary protection. 77 
However, it is indisputable that lawyers do have legally protectable 
interests in their relationships with clients. 
With limited exceptions not pertinent here, a client has a right to 
discharge an attorney. 78 But if the discharge is made without cause, 
virtually all states hold that the client is liable to the discharged 
lawyer for unpaid hourly fees or for the quantum meruit value of 
services performed under a contingent-fee contract. 79 Indeed, Texas 
goes so far as to treat a discharge without cause as a breach of a 
contingent-fee contract by the client that entitles the lawyer to the full 
value of the contract, calculated as though services had been com-
pletely performed. 80 These rules on liability for fees are one 
indication that personal interests of an attorney in an attorney-client 
relationship are legally cognizable. 
More important for present purposes, the law of tortious 
interference protects contractual relationships, even those such as 
attorney-client contracts, that are terminable at willY The law of 
tortious interference safeguards interests in a relationship from 
unprivileged purposeful or knowing disruption by a person outside the 
relationship. According to the formulation found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, under the law of tortious interference: 
[oJne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract ... between another and a third person, by preventing the other 
from performing the contract or causing his performance to be more 
expensive and burdensome, is subject to liability to the other for the 
pecuniary loss resulting to him. 82 
77. ld. at 736 (commenting that "the purpose of the Rule 4.2 ... is primarily to 
protect opposing clients and only incidentally to protect lawyers. "). 
78. See, e.g .• TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.15 cme 4 
(explaining that in Texas. a client has the right "to discharge an attorney at any time. 
with or without cause"). 
79. See generally Vincent R. Johnson. Client Liability for Fees of Discharged 
Counsel. TRiAL, Apr. 1990. at 99 (explaining that a discharged attorney may recover the 
quantum meruit value of services performed). 
80. See Mandell & Wright v. Thomas. 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) 
(explaining that in Texas "an attorney may recover on the contract for the amount of his 
compensation" when discharged without good cause). 
81. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977) (explaining that until 
such contract is terminated. it is valid and subsisting). 
82. ld. § 766A (1977). 
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In one sense, the represented person rule can be understood as an 
extension of the principles of tortious interference. That is, the rule's 
anti-contact ban imposes what in essence is a form of mandatory 
injunction against the type of interference with a relationship that 
might support an action for damages. So viewed, the ethical 
prohibition is seriously flawed, for it obviates any inquiry into the 
critical issues that determine under tort law whether interference is, 
rather than simply may be, actionable. 
Interference resulting from the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion is generally privileged. 83 The same is true of interference that is 
caused by conduct that is undertaken in furtherance of a duty to 
protect the interests of another, 'f that conduct does not involve 
"wrongful means" (such as threats, falsity or violence).84 These 
principles mean that under tort law, in [ddny instances, a lawyer 
would have no cause of action for relational disruption resulting from 
opposing counsel's communication with his or her client. In addition, 
some courts decline to follow the Restatement formulation of tortious 
interference and hold that mere "burdening" of the performance of a 
contract is not actionable, even if destruction of a relationship will 
support a suit for damages. 85 Since many communications by 
83. See id. § 772(a) (1977) (stating that it is not tortious interference of contract 
to give truthful information to a third person); World Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 
1089, 1092 (lIth Cif. 1994) (stating that § 772 retlects the law of Florida); Liebe v. City 
Fin. Co., 295 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that transmission of truthful 
information is privileged); Delloma v. Conso!. Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 171 (7[h CiL 
1993) (explaining that Illinois law provides a privilege "if the defendant acted in good 
faith to protect an interest or uphold a duty"). But see Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 
786, 790 (Utah 1994) (rejecting Restatement section [hat provides a privilege for truthful 
information) . 
84. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1977); see also Tarleton State 
Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ dism. 'd by 
agr.) (explaining that vice-president for student services did not improperly interfere with 
tenure applicant's relationship with university by informing president of university about 
applicant's behavior at a school function). 
85. See Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 615 (Wyo. 1989) (declining to adopt 
Restatement (Secorul) of Torts § 766A); see also Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. 
Co., 986 F.2d 655, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1993) (casting doubt on Restatement (Secorul) of 
Torts § 766A and declining to decide whether Pennsylvania would adopt it). But see 
Larouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1986) (awarding 
damages for burdens entailed by false statement that interview, which later took place, 
had been cancelled). 
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opposing counsel with a represented person not result in 
termination of the representation, but merely "burden" the representa-
tion in the sense of making it more difficult or time consuming, or 
less productive, such interference might not be actionable in tort. For 
these reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to defend the repre-
sented person rule as a legitimate device for protecting the personal 
interests of an attorney in a lawyer-client relationship. It makes no 
sense to "enjoin" conduct that would be legally insufficient to support 
an action for damages. 
Furthermore, the principles of tortious interference are applicable 
only if a plaintiff has a legitimate expectation in the future relations 
that are the basis of the claim. What this means is that there must be 
an existing valid contract or a "reasonable probability" that one will 
be consummated. 86 The loss of a relationship that is merely hoped for 
will not support a cause of action. 87 If it is a matter of speculation 
whether a relationship will come to fruition, there is no cause of 
action for tortious interference with prospective advantage. 
Counsel for an uncertified class has no more than a hope that a 
relationship will be consummated with unnamed putative class 
members, for it is entirely speculative whether the court (after 
considering the requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality, 
and representativeness) will certify the class88 and whether those 
putative members (after being apprised of the action and available 
opportunities) will elect to opt out of the class. For that reason alone, 
the attorney-interest-protection rationale fails to justify an extension 
of the anti-contact rationale to the pre-certification context of class 
action litigation. 
86. See Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F .2d 1368, 1392 (3d eiL 
1991 ) (explaining that a medical school applicant failed to demonstrate H reasonable 
probability" of acceptance). 
87. See id. (stating that although the applicant "had a 'satisfactory academic 
record and background,' she had 'not demonstrated more than a mere hope in securing 
a prospective relationship with a medical school''') (citations omitted). 
88. All four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be met before certification of a class 
is appropriate. See Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798,810 (5th eir. 1982). 
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IV. Conclusion 
The ethical prohibition against contact with represented persons 
is an exacting rule that carries with it the threat of serious conse-
quences, including, but not limited to, attorney discipline, disqualifi-
cation of counsel, and inadmissibility of evidence obtained in 
violation of its terms. The rule is so deeply entrenched in American 
law practice that any attempts to change its fundamental contours are 
probably ill-fated. Nonetheless, extension of the rule to new settings 
should be undertaken with the greatest care, particularly because its 
anti-contact provisions often prove to be unnecessarily harsh and there 
are other regulatory alternatives available. The various rationales 
offered in support of the rule fail to justify an application of the 
contact ban to communications with unnamed putative class members 
during the pre-certification period of class action litigation. Conse-
quently, before certification, unnamed putative class members should 
not be treated as "represented persons" for purposes of the rule. 
